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Abstract 
 
Our paper uses an extensive sample of 292 oilfields to provide evidence that 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) supplementary disclosures do not 
capture the price sensitivities of O&G disclosures implicit in the two main 
forms of oilfield ownership, concession and production sharing contracts 
(PSCs). SEC present value disclosures for both forms of ownership are shown 
to be significantly more responsive to oil prices than stock return sensitivities 
noted by Rajgopal (1999). Importantly, we show that unlike concessions, 
reserve and production disclosures vary in response to oil price movements 
for PSC regimes. Our results highlight the need to differentiate PSC 
disclosures from concession fields, and to fully reflect price risks implicit in 
oilfield ownership contracts. We extend findings by Rajgopal (1999) and 
propose refinements necessary to capture contractual price risk effects on 
SEC disclosures for assets in the O&G sector. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior studies have shown oilfield disclosures to be value relevant in 
interpreting assets and earnings of companies in the oil and gas (O&G) 
industry (Boone, 2002). Reserve disclosures for companies in the energy 
sector provide important information needed to interpret the current and 
prospective performance of oil and gas exploration and production (see e.g. 
Quirin et al, 2000; Magnan and Cormier, 2002). Boone (2002) undertakes a 
survey of an extensive earlier debate as to SEC present value disclosures and 
confirms their value relevance. We contribute by providing evidence that 
current disclosures lack detailed asset data pertaining to ownership structures 
and their exposures to oil price volatility. The importance of oil price effects 
on reserve replacement and reporting is particularly relevant in the energy 
sector where reliance upon accounting return measures that ignore the 
economic value of capital invested in oil and gas (O&G) reserves have been 
shown to be potentially misleading (Antill and Arnott 2004; Osmundsen et al, 
2006).  
 
Rajgopal (1999) tested market risk effects in the O&G sector, acknowledging 
that ‘while the SEC concludes that ‘quantitative disclosures should help 
investors better understand specific market risk disclosures of different 
registrants’ (SEC1997, 6048)……..market risk disclosures are unlikely to be 
reliable and plagued with measurement problems’ (P 252). Pincus and 
Rajgopal (2002) also touch on the concept of reserve write downs, but in the 
context of sharp oil price declines that necessitate reserve revision. Despite 
findings by Clinch and Magliolio (1992) that reserves up to three years in the 
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future are associated with ruling oil price sensitivities, it is not possible from 
current SEC O&G financial reporting to assess the potential effect of oil price 
variability on future SEC proven reserves and production entitlement. In other 
words the quantity of underlying PSC oil and gas assets for corporates are 
themselves a function of oil price levels and current disclosures provide no 
way of measuring this effect. 
 
Our paper examines these price effects on disclosures, and the extent to 
which oil sector reserve ownership is affected by previously the unstudied 
effects of high oil prices driving down corporate reserve entitlement. The 
production sharing contracts (PSC) that cause this effect are shown in our 
study to have price varying effects similar to derivative contracts. The 
existence and price sensitivity of these contracts as they relate to underlying 
oilfields, are an alternative to concession ownership structures, and represent 
between 30 to 40 percent of emerging global reserve replacement 
opportunities.  The nature of these contracts is not well understood and nor 
are details available from current SEC disclosures. As a result little academic 
work has been done on the effects of oil price on these alternative ownership 
structures.  
 
PSC agreements vary widely but typically provide oil companies with a 
guarantee to cover a return on their capital costs and, in exchange, impose a 
reserve entitlement structure. The contract generally escalates participation 
sharing by the local government based on the price of oil and in some cases 
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the volume of oil pumped.1 Specifically and contractually linking asset 
entitlement to a range of oilfield returns generated primarily by commodity 
prices differentiates oilfields from other market sensitive corporate assets. 
Our paper focuses on this trait by interpreting government take as analogous 
to option claims against company reserves possessed by the field’s local 
government - an interpretation that recognises the contractual nature of 
possible fiscal claims against oilfields (Lund 1992). This interpretation 
provides a framework for us to consider the disclosure requirements of 
underlying assets and financial instrument disclosures as identified by 
Rajgopal (1999) and to compare oil price effects on oilfield asset disclosures. 
The financial effects of production sharing contracts, driven by high oil prices, 
are becoming widespread in the O&G sector. Exxon’s PSC production is 
expected to move from 18 to 38 percent by 2010, and BP from 8 to 20 
percent over the same period and, with the exception of Shell, other oil 
majors are showing similar trends. 2  
 
Rajgopal (1999) notes that there are problems with price risk data, the 
disclosure of which provides inconsistent tabular information in his study. 
Rajgopal derives a O&G equity value beta as a constant at 0.247 percent per 
1 percent change in the oil price (gas beta 0.072) and notes that beta ‘ is 
subject to measurement error because they are averages over the 1993-1996 
period, whereas the theory……suggests that oil and gas price sensitivities 
depend on firm-specific and time period-specific stock of underlying reserves 
and the derivative strategy’ sensitivities’ (P 268). This observation by 
                                                 
1 The contractual take by the local government can be interpreted as a form of taxation. In the 
Oil and Gas sector the term fiscal take is used for the (present) value of all forms of 
government taxation including any contractual take under the terms of a PSC. 
2 Shell is expected to reduce PSC production from nearly 50% to 30% - Anticipated PSC 
production is sourced from Deutsche Bank (2004) 
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Rajgopal allows the contribution of our empirical study; we use a study of 
extensive oilfield data to highlight the asymmetrical price sensitivities of O&G 
reserve entitlement (and thereby SEC disclosures) to price sensitivity.  
 
We use our 292 oilfields to measure oilfield disclosures under varying price 
conditions and contribute to prior work on price risk disclosures. We find that 
O&G disclosures are significantly more variable than the oil price beta for 
equity value noted by Rajgopal (1999). Evidence is provided that disclosures 
respond to oil price movements in a variable manner; over the range US$22.5 
– USD$ 33.75 the concession field present values (PV) in the Gulf of Mexico 
(GoM) sample increase by 1.306 percent per 1 percent change in oil price, 
with the increase falling to 1.21 percent per 1 percent change in the range 
USD$ 67.5- USD$ 90. The asymmetrical response for Angola PSC field PVs is 
more marked with a response rate of 1.587 and 0.332 per 1 percent change 
for the same oil price ranges as above. The most marked difference between 
concession ownership and production sharing disclosures is that reserves and 
production do not vary in response to oil price movements for concession 
fields, while both production and reserves vary under PSC regimes. To 
illustrate, for our GoM sample, reserve and production entitlement remains 
unchanged across the full price range USD$ 22.5 – USD$90. Angolan PSC 
reserves, by comparison, actually decrease by 0.451 percent per 1 percent oil 
price change in the range USD$ 22.5 – USD 33.75 and decrease by 0.388 
percent in the range USD 67.5 - USD 90. Production entitlement, by 
comparison, also reduces in Angola, but by 0.291 percent and 0.181 percent 
respectively over the same price intervals. 
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Disclosure rules currently do not capture these price variant effects in 
financial statements, an insight that perhaps goes some way toward 
explaining the conflicting results in prior value relevance studies. Rules for 
supplementary information on underlying reserves, SEC (SEC, 1981) and 
FASB (FASB, 1982), are rooted in an era dominated by concessionary oilfield 
ownership structures. In contrast to concession ownership where reserves 
entitlement rests with the operator, PSC agreements provide government 
regimes an entitlement to share oilfield production with producers. The 
emergence of PSCs in the 1990s, means, however, that the nature and 
behavior of price sensitive government claims are not reflected in SEC 
disclosures; nor have their effects on disclosures been covered in previous 
research. We suggest that present SEC disclosures do not reflect the potential 
ownership effects of price volatility on ‘bookable’ reserves.  Our paper bridges 
this gap and builds upon previous work that examines the importance of 
supplementary SEC disclosures in the context of concessionary arrangements 
(Berry et al 2004, Boone, 2002; Spear, 1994 and 1996; Alciatore, 1993). We 
specifically examine reserve entitlement structures, their response to price 
volatility, and the nature of variations in SEC disclosures, comparing 
concession agreements to PSC contracts.  
 
Our results suggest that there should be separate PSC and concession reserve 
disclosures - based on our evidence that the two kinds of agreement behave 
significantly differently in response to oil and gas price changes. In line with 
Rajgopal (1999), we recommend that supplementary information should 
disclose the effects of oil and gas price changes on underlying reserve 
disclosures. Finally, given the variety of PSC terms in use between countries, 
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and even from field to field within the same country (Bindeman, 1999), we 
propose that whenever PSC terms are unique, disclosures of claim terms 
should be separately displayed whenever they are specifically part of the 
oilfield contract. 
 
In the next section we provide background in the form of the historical 
development of the SEC and FASB disclosure rules, the emergence of PSCs 
and a brief review of the literature that has tested these rules. In particular 
we emphasise the contingent and contractual nature of PSC terms and the 
importance of disclosing these separately from concession holdings. In 
sections III to IV we use our sample of oilfields across 6 oil producing 
countries to provide empirical evidence of the scale and effect of the reserve 
(claim) accounting problem facing accountants and analysts. Section III 
covers the research design, section IV the sample selection and data, and 
section V the empirical results. Section VI concludes with a discussion of these 
results and emphasises the need for responses from policy makers in relation 
to shortfalls in disclosure practice. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
Current SEC Disclosures ‘presume’ Concession Reserve Structures 
SEC disclosures do not differentiate between oilfield ownership structures, 
notwithstanding the very different nature of their legal entitlement to 
underlying reserves. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, an era dominated 
by concession oilfield reserve ownership, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a 
series of standards dealing with the accounting and disclosure of underlying 
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oil and gas activities. First, the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 19, (SFAS19: FASB, 1977), required oil and gas companies to account for 
their oil and gas activities at historical cost using successful efforts method 
(SE) instead of the full cost method (FC). Additionally, SFAS19 required the 
disclosure of (1) costs incurred in production activities, (2) capitalized costs 
relating to production activities, and (3) proved reserve quantities. However, 
the SEC unhappy that neither the SE nor the FC methods were appropriate for 
communicating oil and gas firms’ underlying asset and reserve values, 
developed a new method of accounting for values of oil and gas reserves. As 
a result, the SEC issued Accounting Series Releases No. 253 (SEC, 1978) and 
No. 269 (SEC, 1979) through which it proposed Revenue Recognition 
Accounting (RRA) valuing the reserves directly from estimated cash flows 
rather than past incurred costs. Additionally, oil and gas firms were permitted 
to use either of the SE and FC methods, which in turn instigated the FASB to 
issue Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 25 (FASB, 1979), 
which effectively suspended the historical cost accounting method 
requirement in SFAS19. Furthermore, the RRA did not gain wide support and 
a few years later the SEC dropped the concept of pure cash flow estimation 
(SEC, 1981), handing over the issue to the FASB who were developing 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 69. This standard, 
issued in 1982, established the set of reserve disclosures which to this day 
determine the information content of SEC filings and financial reports. 
Specifically, neither contractually specified claims, nor the price risk 
exposures of physical reserves, have historically been subject to disclosure.  
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To overcome this SEC shortfall, our disclosure recommendations build on 
principles contained highlighted by Rajgopal (1999) and contained in SEC 
ruling of (1997). Justification for this approach is found in the SEC (1997, 
6044) definition which specifically defines market risk as the risk of loss 
arising from adverse changes in market rates and prices, such as interest 
rates, foreign currency rates and similar market rate or price changes. 
 
The Relevance of Market Risk in Supplementary Oil and Gas 
Disclosures 
There is a body of literature that tests accounting measures and 
supplementary disclosure of reserves in the oil and gas industry. We suggest 
that the debate in these studies have been in part caused by the lack of data 
about the type of oilfield assets held by the companies under analysis. Early 
researchers, for instance, hampered by the lack of access to oilfield data and 
the applicable contractual terms cast doubt on the reliability of the value 
relevance of historic cost and even the ‘present values’ of oil and gas reserves 
(Magliolo, 1986; Harris and Ohlson, 1987; Shaw and Weir, 1993), and 
changes in reserves (Spear, 1993; 1996). Only recently have several 
researchers, using revised methodologies, provided evidence supporting the 
value relevance of present values (Berry et al, 2004; Bryant, 2003; Boone, 
2002). None of these studies, however, covers the distinction between the 
present value of concession and PSC contracts, or the relative effects of 
market risk (oil price volatility) on reported reserves.  
 
Likewise, there is little research support for the notion that contractual claims 
under PSCs might require contingency disclosure under Statement of Financial 
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Accounting Standards No. 5 (SFAS 5, FASB, 1975). Scope for PSC disclosure 
may also be offered by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 
(SFAS133, FASB 1997) and Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (SEC, 1997), 
which introduced a requirement for commodity price risk disclosures. No 
studies have until this point applied these statements to contingent claims 
against underlying oilfield assets, preferring to focus on their application to 
derivative disclosures which involve using one of three alternative formats: 
tabular disclosure, response analysis or value at risk.  
 
Rajgopal (1999), for instance, studying the informativeness of commodity 
price risk financial instrument disclosures required by FR-48 (SEC, 1997), cast 
doubt on claims that the new market risk disclosures do not reflect firms’ risk 
exposure in the oil and gas sector. The sensitivity analysis format of the FR-
48 requires firms to report explicit estimates of fair value gains and losses on 
derivative positions due to changes in the underlying commodity. In addition, 
it encourages firms to voluntarily present fair value gains and losses on the 
underlying exposure to changes in prices. Rajgopal (1999) did find that 
proxies for the fair value response of the underlying exposure (oil and gas 
derivatives) were positively (negatively) associated with oil and gas betas. 
Moreover, the tabular and response formats each possessed incremental 
utility in explaining oil and gas betas. Currently in the O&G sector, estimates 
of the potential fair gains and losses on underlying oilfield contracts are not 
subject to similar reporting requirements. 
 
Rajgopal is not alone in his price risk findings, Ahmed et al (2006), compared 
the valuation implications of derivative fair value information - in the banking 
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sector. Importantly, their findings suggest that SFAS No. 133 has increased 
transparency of the nature of derivative financial instruments. Again, we 
anticipate that similar disclosure requirements for underlying O&G reserves 
would result in a transparency of the contingent nature of underlying PSC 
contracts.  
 
To account for uncertainty surrounding future reserves it has been 
recommended (Arnott, 2004) that there should be a simple adjustment to 
SEC rules on reserves reporting to require companies to show reserves 
booked on a field by field basis. Whilst such finely grained tabular information 
might be regarded as confidential by companies we show that, at a minimum, 
disclosures should distinguish between PSC and concession reserve 
entitlement. Our paper adopts a position similar to that proposed for price risk 
by Rajgopal (1999), establishing the need for price response disclosures of 
underlying oilfield assets. Our proposal recognises the existence of price 
sensitive contractual conditions and emphasises the need for the commodity 
price responsiveness of present values, reserves and production sharing to be 
disclosed. 
 
Principal differences between PSC and Concession Market Risk 
Disclosures 
Traditional oilfield concession ownership is found in the Gulf of Mexico, 
Europe, and Australasia (amongst others). Under these royalty structures, if 
producers generate a profit from ongoing extraction, they pay corporation 
tax, sometimes supplemented with revenue, royalty or other taxes. In this 
instance, producers own the underlying reserves, with reported reserves 
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being the recoverable reserves from the reservoir in total, and future physical 
reserve entitlement is unaffected by price volatility. 
 
By contrast, early cost recovery production sharing contracts were signed in 
Indonesia in 1965 and now exist in many of the world’s newer oil producing 
and non OECD regions including West Africa, Kazakhstan, Indonesia and 
Egypt. The proliferation of these agreements in the 1990s has been a direct 
result of government desire to reclaim control of natural resources once a fair 
return has been earned by the corporate producers. The PSC allows 
contractual contingent claims (often in forms of taxation or production 
sharing) to be made against producer reserves when an agreed threshold of 
return is met and costs have been covered.  
 
At present the SEC requires a simple disclosure of price risk, measured by the 
response of profits to changes in oil/gas prices. We use our findings above to 
show that this approach focuses on the immediate ‘income effect’ without 
reference to effects on sustainable reserves, future production entitlement or 
NPV. For instance Exxon Mobil’s 2006 SEC disclosures of total price risk state: 
 
 ‘Crude oil, natural gas, petroleum product and chemical prices have 
fluctuated in response to changing market forces. The effect of these price 
fluctuations on earnings from Upstream, Downstream and Chemical 
operations have varied. In the Upstream, based on the 2005 worldwide 
production levels, a $1 per barrel change in the weighted-average realized 
price of oil would have approximately a $400 million annual after-tax effect on 
Upstream consolidated plus equity company earnings. …….. For any given 
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period, the extent of actual benefit or detriment will be dependent on the 
price movements of individual types of crude oil, taxes and other government 
take effects, price adjustment lags in long-term gas contracts, and crude and 
gas production volumes. Accordingly, changes in benchmark prices for crude 
oil and natural gas only provide a broad indicator of changes in earnings 
experienced in any particular period.’  
 
Conspicuously no price response is declared for disclosed SEC reserves in 
terms of either quantity of reserves or production entitlement or present 
value. The distinction in market risk on government take has a direct bearing 
on the two main components of supplementary SEC disclosure requirements 
of: (1) disclosures of proved oil and gas reserve quantities and annual 
changes therein, and (2) disclosures of proved oil and gas reserve values 
(using a standardised measure) and annual changes therein. Proved reserves 
of oil and gas3, production4 (an important element in the changes in proved 
reserves) and the expected net present value of the proved oil and gas 
reserves (the standardized measure5) have all been shown to be value 
relevant, we therefore focus on these three SEC measures in our analysis.  
                                                 
3 FASB (1982) defines proved oil and gas reserves as “Net quantities of an enterprise's interests in proved 
reserves and proved developed reserves of (a) crude oil (including condensate and natural gas liquids) and 
(b) natural gas shall be disclosed as of the beginning and the end of the year. "Net" quantities of reserves 
include those relating to the enterprise's operating and nonoperating interests in properties as defined in 
paragraph 11(a) of Statement 19. Quantities of reserves relating to royalty interests owned shall be 
included in "net" quantities if the necessary information is available to the enterprise; if reserves relating to 
royalty interests owned are not included because the information is unavailable, that fact and the 
enterprise's share of oil and gas produced for those royalty interests shall be disclosed for the year. "Net" 
quantities shall not include reserves relating to interests of others in properties owned by the enterprise.”  
4 FASB (1982) includes production of oil and gas in its definition of the changes in proved reserves: 
“Changes in the net quantities of an enterprise's proved reserves of oil and of gas during the year shall be 
disclosed. Changes resulting from each of the following shall be shown separately with appropriate 
explanation of significant changes; (a) Revisions of previous estimates, (b) Improved recovery, (c) 
Purchases of minerals in place, (d) Extensions and discoveries, (e) Production and (f) Sales of minerals in 
place.” 
5 FASB (1982) defines the standardized measure as “A standardized measure of discounted future net cash 
flows relating to an enterprise's interests in (a) proved oil and gas reserves (paragraph 10) and (b) oil and 
gas subject to purchase under long-term supply, purchase, or similar agreements and contracts in which 
the enterprise participates in the operation of the properties on which the oil or gas is located or otherwise 
serves as the producer of those reserves (paragraph 13) shall be disclosed as of the end of the year. The 
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The primary research question in our study is whether disclosure 
requirements for price sensitive contractual claim terms should be 
differentiated from the SEC disclosures designed for concession entitlement. 
We find it instructive to isolate the price variable nature of oilfields by using 
our sample to examine both the amount and the response of SEC disclosures 
to oil price variations. Our expectations are clear, if SEC concession and PSC 
supplementary disclosure responses across our empirical sample prove to be 
differentially responsive to market risks, then as noted by Rajgopal (1999) 
there would be justification for their separate disclosure.  
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
We conduct an empirical study of how, when subject to commodity price 
variability, ownership disclosures differ across ownership regimes, and even 
within regimes. Our first test is for the significance of response differences 
between PSC and concession SEC disclosure requirements. A comparative 
empirical analysis of PSC and concession oil and gas price responses against 
GoM concession benchmarks allows us to achieve two insights; firstly, we 
conduct an analysis of concession oil price responses relative to the GoM – 
identifying regime differences between concessions and PSCs. Secondly, PSC 
fields were compared to GoM – identifying the extent of inter sample 
differences. This approach provides consistent and comparable country 
                                                                                                                                                   
standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows relating to those two types of interests in 
reserves may be combined for reporting purposes. The following information shall be disclosed in the 
aggregate and for each geographic area for which reserve quantities are disclosed in accordance with 
paragraph 12; (a) Future cash inflows, (b) Future development and production costs, (c) Future income tax 
expenses, (d) Future net cash flows, (e) Discount and (f) Standardized measure of discounted future net 
cash flows.” 
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insights for all three SEC disclosures, testing whether Corporate SEC PSC and 
concession disclosures for oil and gas reserves, production and NPV responses 
differ by country - when compared to GoM concession disclosures.  
 
Our second test lifts out the potential differences between PSC regimes by 
comparing PSCs against each other. This enables us to determine whether it 
is sufficient to disclose PSC as a homogenous group or whether the wide 
range of PSC terms illustrated in Appendix 3 make it necessary to disclose 
PSC terms individually. 
 
The Model - Demonstrating Differences in SEC Disclosures for PSC and 
Concession  
 
Our taxation models are computationally intensive and differ (in line with tax 
terms) from regime to regime and indeed from field to field. The strength of 
our analysis is that field by field taxation computations are individually 
performed for the actual taxation terms applicable for each of the 292 oilfields 
for each of the five prices. Country tax protocols are programmed into GEM 
and used to underpin an empirical comparison of differential SEC disclosures 
as between actual PSC and concessionary ownership structures for oilfields in 
our sample. 
 
To provide the reader with an understanding of the method and details of PSC 
oilfield calculations, an example of one actual field’s calculations at a base 
case price of US$45 are shown in Appendices 1 and 2. Due to the practical 
difficulties of disclosing detailed PSC tax calculations on a field by field basis 
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for all fields at all price decks, we do not show these separately, but provide 
an overview of the range of concession and PSC terms applicable to fields in 
our sample in Appendix 3. 
 
We use an actual Angolan field (with the production profile altered to preserve 
confidentiality) to provide a simplified insight into the differences that the 
application of the P45 price deck to different concession and PSC terms cause.6 
Firstly, we treat the field as if it is held under a domestic Angolan PSC 
agreement (Appendix 1) and then under GoM concession terms (Appendix 2). 
We use the specimen field to derive and calculate each figure in the P45 
columns of Table 1. This gives the PSC disclosures for reserves (408 mmboe), 
production (9000 boe/day) and NPV (US$3182 million) figures for an oil price 
scenario of US$45 in 2006, Appendix 1. Similarly, we calculate the 3 SEC 
measures for the same hypothetical field - identical to the specimen PSC field 
in every respect save that it is subject to concessionary terms. For purposes 
of the comparison, we have used the terms applicable to a GoM deepwater 
field. Appendix 2, Table B gives the SEC calculation of reserves (700 mmboe), 
production (9000 boe/day) and NPV (US$6545 million).  
 
Our price response analysis of disclosures, as supported by taxation 
computations for each field, is presented over 5 price ranges. As our 
benchmark we set US$45 as the base case price deck, with the US$45 price 
deck analogous to the year end price used in current SEC disclosures. Our 
choice of price range is judgemental based on recent (2006) oil prices and 
their potential option implied volatility; we calculate SEC disclosures at 
                                                 
6 The production profile has been changed to preserve confidentiality. 
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US$45, the base case price, two upside price decks US$67.5 and US$90, as 
well as two downside decks of US$33.75 and US$22.5 to demonstrate the 
price variable response of SEC disclosures.  
 
Table 1 sets out an analysis of disclosure performances on either side of the 
P45 price deck, and provides a summary of how our Angolan field disclosures 
look as at January 2006 under different price assumptions. The P22.5 - P90 
comparison illustrates the effect that price variability can have upon 
ownership SEC disclosures, and serves to demonstrate the motivation for our 
study. The first point to note is that concession reserves remain constant at 
700 mmboe while reserves vary from 240-659 mmboe under PSC terms. 
Table 1 shows that even at a low initial oil price, US$22.5, production sharing 
commences. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As the oil price increases, PSC contract terms result in reserves being 
recouped by government claims, reducing corporate entitlement to 240 
mmboe at US$90, less than half the original entitlement. Production appears 
to remain constant under both regimes. This will be shown to be a short term 
effect; while concession production does in fact remain constant under 
differing price scenarios, PSC production terms would vary over time - see 
figure 1. A PSC phenomenon that would occur if higher prices were to persist 
and result in operators earning their contracted returns through price 
increases rather than production volumes. 
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[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, while the NPV of the specimen field does vary under both structures –
concession fiscal take only increases as a result of price movement, while the 
PSC reserve claw back is dictated by fiscal terms in Appendix 3, where NPV is 
a composite of price and quantity of oil reserves, discounted at a rate of 10 
percent, in line with SEC regulations.  
 
Empirical Tests of SEC Disclosure Responses 
We present our test for differences as to how actual SEC disclosures respond 
to price changes across our oilfield sample in three parts; first we reflect the 
rate of change for the price intervals, then we reflect statistical tests of 
difference between PSCs and concessions as represented by GoM. Specifically, 
disclosure responses are calculated for each field within 5 specific prices (two 
on either side of US$45) to give an indication of the magnitude of change in 
the SEC disclosures per one percent change in the oil and gas price. For 
instance, we simulate the response of reserves, production and remaining PV 
when the oil prices fall from the P45 to the P33.75 scenario. Reserve entitlement 
responses between two price scenarios (referred to as P1 and P2) are 
calculated for each field in all six countries as follows7: 
 
Reserve Response (P1/P2) = 
221
221
/)(
/)(
PPP
PpP
PPP
RRR
−
−
,     (1) 
 
                                                 
7 Formulae are applied such that when P1<P45, the P1 is further from P2, and when P1 is greater than P45 
then P1 >P2 
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where RP1 and RP2 refer to the entitled SEC reserves R22.5, R33.75, R45, R67.5 and 
R90 (in mmboe) under P1 and P2, respectively, under each of the stylised five 
price scenarios. For instance, the reserve response between the P45 (P2) and 
P33.75 (P1) price decks would be calculated as (R33.75 - R45)/R45 / (P33.75 - 
P45)/P45.  
 
Production entitlement responses are calculated as follows: 
 
Production response (P1/P2) = 
221
221
/)(
/)(
PPP
PPP
PPP
QQQ
−
−
,    (2) 
 
where QP1 and QP2 refer to the entitled SEC production Q22.5, Q33.75, Q45, Q67.5 
and Q90 (in mmboe) under P1 and P2, respectively, under each of the stylised 
five price scenarios. 
 
PV responses are calculated as follows: 
 
PV response (P1/P2) = 
221
221
/)(
/)(
PPP
PPP
PPP
NPVNPVNPV
−
−
 ,    (3) 
 
where NPVP1 and NPVP2 refer to the remaining PVs: NPV22.5, NPV33.75, NPV45, 
NPV67.5 and NPV90 (in mmboe) under P1 and P2, respectively, under each of 
the stylised five price scenarios. 
 
The above allow us to analyse whether the commodity price responses of SEC 
disclosures in the concession regimes NCS and UKCS, and the PSC regimes 
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Angola, Egypt and Indonesia are statistically different from the equivalent 
responses in the concession countries US GoM, NCS and UKCS. The use of  t-
tests for difference are based on underlying field data. This approach 
introduces the principle that differential responses of SEC measures is based 
on ownership structures an demonstrate material variations in current 
disclosure between PSC and concession fields. 
 
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
 
Industry standard Oilfield data has been provided by the oil and gas 
consultancy Wood McKenzie. We made use of oilfield data from their 
commercially available Global Economic Model (GEM). This is compiled based 
on the analysis of direct technical information from operators and participants 
in the oilfields and all other public domain sources of information. Our sample 
was taken from their January 2006 database, each field has full life revenue, 
costs and taxation set our in panel data, distilled to pre and post tax present 
value calculations. Each field model contains data of the nature of that 
summarised in Appendix 1, Table 1A. From the total population we use 
stratified sampling to select a size varying sample of oilfields from each 
country (Cochrane 1946). We are guided in stratification by the findings of 
Kretzschmar & Moles (2006) who in their study of real option models found 
that fields displayed size varying characteristics. Fields with less than 6 million 
barrels of remaining oil and gas equivalent were therefore eliminated as 
abandonment expenses introduce idiosyncratic behaviour that would focus on 
the tax relief of abandonment costs rather than reserve disclosures for the 
predominantly producing fields in our study - Table 2. 
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Our sample represents oilfields containing between 80-90 percent of the total 
remaining oil and gas reserves in GoM, NCS, Angola, Egypt and Indonesia and 
approximately 50 percent of the reserves in UKCS. To our knowledge, no 
other academic study of oilfield ownership behaviour have analysed samples 
of a similar size. Each of the 6 regimes in our sample was selected for their 
fiscal homogeneity (Appendix 3).  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section we report the results of our tests for differences between field 
disclosure responses to price movements. GoM fields are used as a concession 
benchmark for differential responses of fields in the UKCS and NCS. Similarly 
Angola, Egypt and Indonesia responses are in turn tested against GoM in 
order to compare PSC SEC disclosure responses with concessions. We also 
test for differences between individual countries.  
 
SEC reserve disclosure responses to oil price variations - Comparisons 
to the GoM Benchmark 
Concession reserve entitlement does not move in response to oil price 
changes (upper half of Table 3). The UK and Norway concession reserve 
responses are identical to GoM in showing no response to changing prices in 
Panel A. By contrast, the lower half of panel A provides insights into the price 
response of reserve entitlements for oil companies with reserves in PSC 
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regimes. Our t tests reported in Table 3 panel B show that PSCs are (all) 
significantly different from GoM responses at the 0.1 percent level. 
 
Our results layout allows readers to break reserve responses into price ranges 
and show that the PSC sample measured by Angolan, Egyptian and 
Indonesian fields are substantially influenced by changes in oil and gas prices. 
This reflects the intuition of Rajgopal (1999) that beta responses depend on 
the periodicity and price ruling for the measurement interval. Jin Jorion also 
mentioned the locality of oilfields as having an effect on prices obtained for 
resources, findings supported by out tabular analysis. For instance, when the 
oil price (and similarly the gas price per boe) decreases by 33.3% from 
$33.75 to $22.5, the reserve response as per our formula is -0.253 for Egypt, 
-0.324 for Indonesia, and -0.451 in the case of Angola - Table 3, Panel A. This 
means, for example, that the reserve entitlement for Egypt increases by 
25.3% of 33.3%, an increase in actual physical reserves of 8.4%. Thus, over 
the price range, the impact on reserve entitlement is approximately a quarter 
the size of the price change. Similarly the impact for Indonesia is 32.4% of 
the price change and for Angola it is 45.1%. The negative signs of the reserve 
responses in Table 3 indicate that reserves move in the opposite direction to 
price. The movement encapsulates the response of disclosures to moves in oil 
prices - away from the year end levels of US$45 – that would be shown using 
SEC guidelines. There is for PSCs therefore an increase in reserve entitlement 
as price falls and vice versa. It is also noteworthy that, in the case of Egypt 
and Angola the reserve responses peak in the price range $45 to $33.75 
whereas for Indonesia the most response is in the lower price range of $33.75 
to $22.5. The pattern of reserve responses is a function of the terms of the 
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PSC with the older Indonesian agreements being crafted in an era of lower oil 
price expectations.  
 
When the oil price increases by 33.3% from $67.5 to $90, Table 3 shows a 
response in reserve entitlement of 0.130 (of 33.3%) for Indonesia, 0.132 for 
Egypt and 0.388 in the case of Angola. These responses represent decreases 
in reserve entitlement as price rises. In all three cases the rate of decrease is 
moderated as prices rise (in the case of Angola from a response of 0.405 over 
the range from $45 to $67.5 to 0.388 over the range $67.5 to $90). 
Importantly, rate of change is dependent on PSC contract terms as they apply 
to the field and again varies by price range, depending on the contract terms.  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
SEC reserve disclosure responses to oil price variations – 
Comparisons between PSC Regimes 
PSCs in turn demonstrate a wide range of responses between different PSC 
contracts in response to the same price change. Angola has the most 
aggressive production sharing terms, resulting in a 0.405 (of 50%) reserve 
decrease for the 50% increase in price from $45 to $67.5. (Egypt and 
Indonesia are both at 0.154). It is relevant to note that this effect is opposite 
on the downside, with reserves disclosed increasing for Angola by a rate of 
0.684 of 33.3% in response to a 33.3% fall in price from US$45 to US$33.75.  
 
The significant differences in reserve responses between Angola and both 
Egypt and Indonesia support our proposal that not only should there be 
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separate reserve disclosures for PSCs in the first instance, but also separate 
disclosure by contract type. 
 
SEC production disclosures - responses to oil price variations - 
Comparisons to the GoM Benchmark 
Production results deconstruct reserve entitlement into annualised production, 
providing evidence that production in concession regimes is unaffected by 
changes in oil and gas prices. The production volumes that oil companies are 
entitled to report remain constant at 100 percent, Table 4, Panel A. 
 
SEC production disclosure responses to oil price variations – 
Comparisons between PSC Regimes 
On the other hand, production entitlement in Angola, Egypt and Indonesia are 
considerably affected. For example, a 33.3% decrease in oil and gas prices 
from $33.75 to $22.5 increases production entitlement by 0.205 (of 33.3%) 
for Egypt, by 0.291 for Angola and by 0.466 in the case of Indonesia. 
Likewise, a 33.3% increase in the commodity price from $67.5 to $90 will 
lead to reserve decreases of 0.064 (of 33.3%) for Indonesia, 0.106 for Egypt 
and 0.181 in the case of Angola. The negative signs assigned to reserve 
responses in Table 4 indicate that production entitlement moves in the 
opposite direction to price. The responses for Egypt and Angola are all 
significantly different from those in GoM at either the 1 percent or the 0.1 
percent level.  
 
 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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Table 4 shows that the three PSC countries of Angola, Egypt and Indonesia 
are not significantly different from each other in terms of the 2006 production 
response to 2006 price change. However, figure 1 demonstrates that such a 
price change does differentially change the pattern of production entitlement 
for PSC countries in the longer term. It is this longer term differential impact 
on production that is picked up in the forthcoming paragraphs which examine 
PV responses to price change.  
   
SEC PV disclosure responses to oil price variations - Comparisons to 
the GoM Benchmark  
Table 5, Panel A reports responses in oilfield PV to changing oil and gas 
prices. As before, Panel B also reports the results of t tests to responses 
between each country and the GoM benchmark and between individual 
countries. The difficulty in interpreting causality behind changes in the PV 
measure stems from the fact that it is a composite of price and production, 
discounted at the SEC rate of 10 percent. Thus the effect of oil prices upon PV 
is somewhat more difficult to interpret, possibly contributing to the need for 
Boone (2002) to revisit previous value relevance studies. It can be seen from 
Table 5 that for all countries the PV response increases as prices fall with the 
largest responses being to a fall in price from $33.75 to $22.5. For example, 
in GoM such a 33.3% fall induces an even bigger percentage fall in PV being 
1.306 times 33.3%. Nevertheless there are significant differences between 
the PV responses.  
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Table 5 shows that for price changes from $33.75 to $22.5, Indonesia, a PSC 
field and NCS, a concession field, have PV response that is significantly 
different (at the 1 percent level) from the GOM benchmark. However at higher 
prices (P67.5/P45 and above) it is Angola and Egypt that have the significantly 
higher PV price response compared to the GOM benchmark. 
 
SEC PV disclosure responses to oil price variations – Comparisons 
between PSC Regimes 
At high oil prices all oilfields experience an increase in PV if prices rise but 
those of Egypt, and in particular Angola, rise at a significantly lower rate. This 
is a reflection of the claw-back of reserves by the Angolan/Egyptian 
government under their PSC terms. Angola has the most aggressive claw-
back. For example, a 50% increase in price from $45 to $67.5 results in a PV 
increase of only 0.33 0f 50%. Table 5 shows that Angola PV responses are 
significantly different from Egypt at all price ranges and from Indonesia at the 
higher price ranges, once again supporting the need for separate SEC 
disclosures for the individual PSC fields.  
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Price and SEC Disclosures - Assessing Current Reserves, Production 
and NPV Reporting 
At present the SEC requires a simple disclosure of price risk, measured by the 
response of profits to changes in oil/gas prices. Conspicuously no price 
response is declared for the disclosed SEC reserves in terms of either quantity 
of reserves or production entitlement or present value. This omission could be 
rectified by an SEC/FASB requirement for straightforward tabular disclosure 
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as illustrated in Tables 6 and 7, differentiating between Concessions and PSCs 
for both the quantity and present value of proven reserves over a range of 
prices.  
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The tabular disclosure encapsulates the asymmetrical relationship between 
price and PSC reserves, reflected in Table 6. Concession reserve entitlement 
does not change in response to price movements, with the response 
remaining firmly at 0 on the Y axis. Angola shows the most variance followed 
by Egypt and Indonesia. The price response of PSC reserves is also not linear 
across the range of prices, reflecting the differing contract terms from 
Appendix 3.  
 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The same price asymmetry exists with PV except that the asymmetry is less 
given the compensatory effects of price increases. Figure 2a pulls the price 
response of reserves together with Figure 2b which shows the NPV response 
to price variations. The effect of the plus 50 and plus 100 percent price 
movement effects are most apparent in Angola, where aggressive production 
sharing causes reserves entitlement to fall 40 percent, while the 
corresponding growth in PSC NPV is 25 percent (relative to concession regime 
reserve loss of zero percent and NPV gain of 125 percent). 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The SEC disclosure presumption that entitlements are consistent across 
ownership structures has been shown to be incorrect for all three SEC 
measures. We suggest that the practice of reporting year end reserves as a 
homogenous asset class conceals value relevant information that would 
enable analysts to determine companies with oil reserves most affected by 
price movements. Our arguments in support of the paper’s recommendations 
are rehearsed in the following paragraphs. 
 
In essence we question the very tenets of SEC resource disclosures. We base 
our enquiry on the existence of undisclosed claims in oilfield ownership 
contracts; noting that an oil and gas firm value can be decomposed into (1) 
the present value of future discretionary cash flows, (2) the present value of 
proven reserves (less contingencies) and (3) the present value of growth and 
development opportunities associated unproven reserves. Given declining 
reserve opportunities and the emergence of production sharing contracts 
(PSCs) an important corporate value determinant is the role that government 
contractual take (and hence residual corporate entitlement) plays in each of 
these three value elements. Each element is contractually dependent upon an 
assumed pattern of future oil prices, and as energy prices rise, fields 
producing through production sharing contracts are shown to have their 
‘bookable’ barrels reduced due to participation by the local government.  
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PSCs are expected to increasingly affect the value of growth and development 
opportunities for oil companies as most of the regions of the world where 
opportunities exist, are adopting PSC arrangements. Since growth and 
development opportunities do not form part of the current supplementary 
disclosures, we do not examine this third effect, but we have examined the 
effect of PSC arrangements upon proven reserve quantities, their present 
values and upon production. Although SEC disclosures are made net of 
contingent claims (at year end prices), the size of potential contractual claims 
is not disclosed and hence the effect of the PSC terms at year end prices, let 
alone their potential effect at future prices, is not readily understood by users 
of financial information.  
 
We have provided an overview of contract terms for a sample of countries 
through which we make a rigorous empirical investigation of the effect of 
PSCs upon the SEC reserve disclosures. We find that, in comparison to 
concessionary terms, the present value of reported reserves under PSCs, is 
significantly more sensitive to oil and gas prices. Moreover, PSC terms directly 
affect both reserve and production quantities also making these disclosures 
sensitive to oil and gas prices. Hence company entitlement is difficult to 
understand in a period of price change and volatility. This in turn makes the 
analyst’s assessment of the annual replacement of reserves more difficult, 
and the isolation of sustainable discretionary cash flow problematic. Another 
effect is that on earnings disclosure - as the price of oil rises and a larger 
share of production comes from PSC regimes, oil companies will experience a 
larger effective tax take. This means that if the current relationship between 
concession and PSC tax rates hold, companies with larger PSC holdings are 
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likely to experience greater increases in effective tax rates than those with 
concession holdings.  
 
Our recommendations suggest that as a minimum there should be separate 
PSC and concession reserve disclosures. Secondly, we recommend that 
supplementary information should reflect the disclosure response, resulting 
from contractual obligations, of SEC reserve disclosures to oil and gas price 
changes. As a general rule we propose that there be separate reserve 
disclosures whenever differences in contract terms result in significantly 
different price response behaviours. Our recommendations are to a large 
extent an extension of emergent principles contained in the extension to SEC 
(1997) dated June 15 1998 which require corporates to disclose market risk 
exposures resultant from derivative and underlying non derivative items (or 
contractual positions) that affect a reader’s understanding of the balance 
sheet. We conclude that contingencies associated with proven reserves are 
important data needed for the valuation of oil and gas companies. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Detailed Calculations of oil and gas reserve entitlement, oil and 
gas production, and Remaining oilfield NPV under PSC tax terms 
Table 1A below shows field data for a large Angolan oilfield.8 Column (a) 
shows the production profile (in thousands of barrels of oil per day) for each 
year in the whole life of the oilfield, while column (b) depicts the 
corresponding price forecast.8 In this specific example the oil produced is of 
Hungo quality (in contrast to West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent 
blend), and this quality of oil is typically sold at a discount to WTI or Brent. 
Annual expected gross revenue (column c is calculated as the product of 
production (column a) and price (column b). Columns (d) and (e) describe the 
expected expenses incurred from operating the field (operating expenses, 
opex) and investments to prepare the field for production (capital 
expenditure, capex), respectively. Company cash flow (column l) is calculated 
as gross revenues less opex, capex and government take. Columns (f) – (k) 
relate to the calculation of government take and profit splits between the 
government and the contractor, and will be described in more detail in Tables 
1B and 1C. Table 1D articulates how the SEC variables reserves, production 
and NPV are calculated. 
                                                 
8 Oil production, field life, operating expenditures and capital expenditures have all been changed in order 
to ensure that no confidential information is revealed.  
 
8 The standardized SEC measure requires the use of the current year-end price of oil over the whole field 
life, we apply a slightly more conservative approach to incorporate findings from Bessembinder et al (1995) 
– for both concessions and PSC calculations. A P45 oil price7 scenario at time 0 consists of US$45/barrel for 
2006, US$40/barrel for 2007, US$37/barrel for 2008, US$35.87/barrel for 2009 and US$36.77/barrel for 
2010. From 2010 onwards, the oil price is increased by 2.5 percent a year. In addition, we develop 4 price 
scenarios where the prices in the P45 scenario is scaled down up or down with a constant factor. For 
instance, we calculate a P33.75 scenario where all the P45 prices are multiplied by 75 percent, resulting in a 
oil price of US$33.75/barrel2 at time 0. Similarly we calculate a P22.5 scenario (50 percent of US$45, 
equivalent to US$22.5/barrel), a P67.5 scenario (150 percent of US$45, equivalent to US$67.5/barrel) and a 
P90 scenario (200 percent of US$45, equivalent to US$90/barrel). We tested this mean reversion against 
SEC tests and found that this is an accurate and more conservative approximation of the price effect on 
SEC PSC disclosures. Using static SEC year end prices actually increases the PSC price effect on reserves by 
enabling PSC claims to occur sooner, simply strengthening conclusions made in this paper. 
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TABLE 1A 
 
Detailed calculation of cash flows for a typical Angolan oilfield under 
Angolan PSC tax terms 
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(c) Gross revenues are calculated by multiplying oil production (annualised) by the oil 
price assumption, i.e.[(a) x (b) x 0.365] 
(c) Opex profile 
(e) Capex profile 
(f) smallest of (e) x 50 percent and (c) [uplifted (40 percent) and depreciated (4 
years)] + (d) 
(g) (c) - (f) 
(h) Profit oil splits (see Table 1B) 
(i) (g) x (h) 
(j) (g) x [1-(h)] 
(k) (j) x 50 percent 
(l) (c) – (d) – (e) – (i) – (k) 
 
 
 
 
Two key features of PSCs are the concepts of cost recovery (termed ‘cost oil’) 
and profit sharing (termed ‘profit oil’). While oil companies under 
concessionary fiscal terms are allowed to sell all of their production to market 
prices, under PSC fiscal terms they are only entitled to the production which 
covers the sum of ‘cost oil’ and ‘profit oil’.  
 
Cost recovery allows the contractor to recoup costs. Additionally, in some 
areas, such as the Angolan deepwater oil fields, contractors are also allowed 
capital costs uplifts, which allows the partner group to uplift all capital costs 
by at least 40 percent. In situations where large, high-cost, development 
projects are required (i.e. the majority of Angola’s deepwater discoveries) the 
capital uplift means that for a project with capital expenditure of US$3 billion 
the recoverable costs are US$4.2 billion. 
 
Production remaining after cost recovery is termed profit oil/gas and is 
divided between the contractor and the government.  The basis on which this 
division is made varies between contracts with more recent contracts based 
on the contractor’s rate of return (ROR) whereas in earlier contracts the split 
was based on cumulative production. 
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All offshore contracts awarded since 1991 fall under the ROR based 
model. During the application process bidders must specify the rate of return 
steps and the profit oil splits applicable to each tier.  The contract allows for 
up to five different tiers of profit splits with rates varying from contract to 
contract. Typical rate of return based profit splits are given in Table 1B: 
TABLE 1B 
Profit splits for a typical Angolan oilfield under PSC tax terms 
 
 (a) IRR = internal rate of return 
(b) State share of profit oil 
(c) Contractor share of profit oil 
 
 
The split is determined by the rate of return achieved in the previous period.  
The ROR calculation is based on the contractor’s accumulated compounded 
post-tax cash flow. The contractor’s cash flow is defined as in Table 1A 
(column (l)).  Exploration expenditure is not included in the computation of 
contractor’s net cash flow.  Only expenditure after the date of commercial 
discovery is included. 
 
The contractor’s cash flow is compounded at each of the ROR rates specified 
in the contract and the profit oil split is taken relating to the highest ROR 
which yields a positive result (Table 1C). The compounded cash flow will by 
(a) (b) (c)
State Contractor
IRR share share
<15% 25% 75%
15% - 25% 35% 65%
25% - 30% 55% 45%
30% - 40% 75% 25%
>40% 85% 15%
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construct turn positive when the rate of return is achieved. For example, the 
2003 company cash flow was minus US$105 million. The relevant Tier 1 cash 
flow for 2004 is calculated as -105 x 1.15 – 323 = -US$ 444 million, while the 
Tier 2 cash flow in the same year is calculated as -105 x 1.25 -323 = -US$ 
454 million. This compounding is done for all the years in the field’s life. In 
2009, the Tier 1 compounded cash flow turns positive (US$622 million) 
signifying that the company has achieved at least 15 percent return on its 
investment. This results in a change in the profit split in favor of the 
government. Total profit oil for the following period is split 35 percent:65 
percent (government percent : contractor percent). 
 
In 2012 the company is expected to have achieved a 30 percent return on its 
investment, and will only be allowed 25 percent of the profit oil.  
TABLE 1C 
Profit split tiers for a typical Angolan oilfield under PSC tax terms 
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(a) Using Table 1A column (l) 
(b) Previous year's (b) x (100 percent + 15 percent) plus (a) where 15 percent is the 
assumed first tier rate of return threshold 
(c) As (b) but using 25 percent 
(d) As (b) but using 30 percent 
(e) As (b) but using 40 percent 
(f) Share determined by reference to Table 1B above. The split applicable in any one 
year is that determined by the rate of return achieved in the previous year (goes to 
column (h) in Table 1A (for following year)). 
 
 
Since oil companies under PSC terms are only entitled to the production which 
covers cost oil and profit oil, their entitled production (Table 1D column (d)) 
will be different from total field production (Table 1D column (b)). In 2006 the 
field is expected to produce 10 million barrels of oil per year. Under 
concession terms, the oil companies would be entitled to the entire 10 million 
barrels/yr. However, under the PSC terms the production entitlement is less 
than this amount. In 2006 the contractors cost oil is US$76 million and its 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Year Applicable 1st Tier 2nd Tier 3rd Tier 4th Tier State
Cash flow Share
US$M US$M US$M US$M US$M %
2003 -105 -105 -105 -105 -105 25%
2004 -323 -444 -454 -460 -470 25%
2005 -552 -1062 -1120 -1150 -1210 25%
2006 -603 -1825 -2003 -2097 -2297 25%
2007 576 -1523 -1928 -2151 -2640 25%
2008 1291 -460 -1119 -1505 -2406 25%
2009 1151 622 -248 -806 -2217 35%
2010 669 1384 360 -378 -2434 55%
2011 435 2027 885 -56 -2973 55%
2012 406 2737 1512 333 -3756 75%
2013 215 3363 2105 648 -5043 75%
2014 222 4089 2854 1064 -6839 75%
2015 209 4912 3776 1592 -9365 75%
2016 196 5844 4916 2266 -12915 75%
2017 183 6904 6328 3129 -17898 75%
2018 175 8115 8085 4243 -24883 75%
2019 167 9499 10273 5683 -34669 75%
2020 159 11084 13000 7547 -48377 75%
2021 152 12898 16403 9963 -67575 75%
2022 145 14978 20649 13098 -94460 75%
2023 138 17363 25949 17165 -132106 75%
2024 43 20011 32480 22358 -184905 75%
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share of profit oil is US$57 million, a total of US$134 million. This is 
equivalent to a production of 3200 barrels per day, or 8.75 million barrels of 
oil a year (sum of cost oil and profit oil divided by market price of oil, i.e. 
134/41.9).  
 
Oil reserves are calculated as the sum of production over the whole field life 
(columns (a) and (c)). As Table 1D shows, the difference between total 
production and entitled production increases with government share of profit 
oil. 
 
The expected net present value of the company cash flow is calculated using a 
discount rate of 10 percent, equivalent to SEC requirements (Table 1D column 
(e)). 
 
[TABLE 1D ABOUT HERE] 
 
TABLE 1D 
Calculation of reserves entitlement, production entitlement and 
Remaining NPV under Angola PSC tax terms 
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 (a) Total field remaining reserves in million barrels of oil equivalent. 
(b) Total field annual production in thousands of barrels of oil equivalent per 
day. 
(c) Companies’ remaining reserves in million barrels of oil equivalent. 
(d) Companies’ entitled annual production (net of royalty) in thousands of 
barrels of oil equivalent per day. Calculated as (b) less royalty (deepwater: 
12.5%). 
 (e) Companies’ net present value of expected entitled cash flows. 
 
 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Remaining Production Entitled Entitled Remaining
reserves reserves production NPV
mmboe 000boe/d mmboe 000boe/d US$M
2003 800 0 412 0 1614
2004 800 0 412 0 1880
2005 800 0 412 0 2391
2006 800 10 408 9 3182
2007 797 100 377 88 4103
2008 760 200 313 175 3938
2009 687 200 251 168 3041
2010 614 180 206 125 2194
2011 549 165 174 86 1744
2012 488 154 145 80 1483
2013 432 144 127 50 1226
2014 379 135 110 44 1133
2015 330 126 95 41 1024
2016 284 118 81 39 917
2017 241 110 68 36 813
2018 201 103 56 34 711
2019 163 96 44 32 608
2020 128 90 33 30 501
2021 95 84 22 29 392
2022 64 79 13 27 279
2023 36 74 3 25 162
2024 9 24 3 9 39
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APPENDIX 2 
Detailed Calculations of oil and gas reserve entitlement, oil and 
gas production, and Remaining oilfield NPV under GoM 
concessionary tax terms 
 
In Table 2A and 2B we describe the calculation of reserves, production and 
remaining NPV for the same field as in Tables 1A-1D, save that it is subject to 
US GoM deepwater taxation (see Appendix 3), and not Angolan PSC tax 
terms. 
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TABLE 2A 
Detailed calculation of cash flows for a typical Angolan oilfield under 
GoM concession tax terms 
 
(a) Oil production profile of a typical field. Yearly figures are shown as thousands of 
barrels of oil per day. Totals are in millions of barrels, calculated as ∑(a) x 0.365 
(conversion from thousands of barrels per day to millions of barrels per year). 
(b) Gas production profile of a typical field. Yearly figures are shown as mmcf gas per 
day. Totals are in mmcf, calculated as ∑(b) x 0.365. 
(c) Cumulative production. Calculated as [(a) + (b) x cr]  x 0.365, where cr is the 
conversion rate from gas (cf) into oil equivalent (bbl). 
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(d) Oil price assumption   
(e) Gas price assumption          
(f) Gross revenues are calculated by multiplying oil and gas (in oil equivalents) by their 
respective price assumptions, i.e.[(a) x (d) x 0.365] + [(b) x (e) x 0.176] x 0.365.          
(g) Operating costs                
(h) Capital expenditure excluding abandonment obligations          
(i) Depreciation of capex; calculated under MACRS (7 years - double declining balance 
switching to straight line after 5 years)   
(j) (f) x Royalty rate, where Royalty rate = 0 percent for (c) < 87.5 mmboe, or Royalty 
= 12.50 percent for (c) > 87.5 mmboe (for deep water oil fields)    
(k) [(f) - (g) - (I) - (j)] x 35 percent              
(l) (c) - (d) – (e) – (f) – (g) – (h) – (i) – (k). 
 
 
 
 
Oil companies’ entitlement to production and reserves in the specific oilfield is 
shown in Table 2B (shaded row shows the values which enter Table 1 in the 
main body of the paper).  
 
TABLE 2B 
Calculation of reserves entitlement, production entitlement and 
Remaining NPV under GoM concession tax terms 
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(a) Total remaining reserves in million barrels of oil equivalent. Calculated as the sum 
of column (b), multiplied by 0.365 (transforming thousands of barrels per day into 
millions of barrels per year). 
(b) Total annual production in thousands of barrels of oil equivalent per day. 
(c) Entitled remaining reserves in million barrels of oil equivalent. Calculated as the 
sum of column (d), multiplied by 0.365 (transforming thousands of barrels per day into 
millions of barrels per year).  
(d) Entitled annual production, net of royalty (12.5% in US GoM Deepwater, See 
Appendix 3) in thousands of barrels of oil equivalent per day. 
(e) Companies’ (and total) net present value of expected entitled cash flows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Year Remaining Production Entitled Entitled Remaining
reserves reserves production NPV
mmboe 000boe/d mmboe 000boe/d US$M
2003 800 0 700 0 4140
2004 800 0 700 0 4659
2005 800 0 700 0 5448
2006 800 10 700 9 6545
2007 797 100 697 88 7774
2008 760 200 665 175 7721
2009 687 200 601 175 7157
2010 614 180 538 158 6688
2011 549 165 480 144 6232
2012 488 154 427 135 5807
2013 432 144 378 126 5391
2014 379 135 332 118 4985
2015 330 126 289 110 4536
2016 284 118 249 103 4087
2017 241 110 211 96 3635
2018 201 103 176 90 3177
2019 163 96 143 84 2711
2020 128 90 112 79 2235
2021 95 84 83 74 1746
2022 64 79 56 69 1241
2023 36 74 31 64 718
2024 9 24 8 21 173
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APPENDIX 3:  
Overview of Fiscal terms under concession and PSC regimes 
Due to the difficulty of disclosing detailed tax terms in concession or PSC 
countries on a field by field basis, we provide an overview of the range of 
concession and PSC terms applicable to all fields in our sample (Table 3A).  
 
Concession terms are set out for each country in columns (a) – (e). In the 
case of US Gulf of Mexico, oil companies are subject to a royalty tax which is 
deducted from the well-head value of the oil, and a federal income tax which 
is taxed on net operating profit. In deepwater GoM, the royalty rate is 12.5 
percent, while it is 16.7 percent in shallow water fields. Although, royalty tax 
is no longer applicable for UKCS and NCS oilfields, oil companies operating in 
these regimes are required to pay either a supplementary corporation tax 
(UKCS) or a supplementary petroleum tax (in UKCS and NCS).  
 
By contrast, PSC tax terms are more complex. Some PSC contracts are based 
on the contractor’s rate of return (based on the contractor’s accumulated 
compounded post-tax cash flow, e.g. Angola IRR, column (f)), whereas in 
other contracts the split is based on cumulative production (e.g. Angola 
PROD, column (g)).  
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TABLE 3A 
Overview of Concession and PSC fiscal terms in sample countries – 
Differentiation insights are made by referring to the concession or 
PSC Tax Base  Termsa  contained in columns (a)-(e) or (f) – (i) 
respectively  
 
(a) Tax terms for non-PRT oilfields on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS).  
(b) Tax terms for PRT oilfields on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS).  
(c) Tax terms for oilfields on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) 
(d) Tax terms for oilfields in shallow water Gulf of Mexico (GoM Shallow water) 
(e) Tax terms for oilfields in deepwater Gulf of Mexico (GoM Deepwater) 
(f) Tax terms for the oilfields in Angola which are subject to Rate of Return (IRR) based 
production sharing contracts. 
(g) Tax terms for the oilfields in Angola which are subject to cumulative production 
(PROD) based production sharing contracts. 
(h) Tax terms for the oilfields in Egypt which are subject to PSC contracts 
(i) Tax terms for the oilfields in Indonesia which are subject to PSC contracts 
 
a Variable definitions: 
R = Royalty tax. Calculated on wellhead value of petroleum produced, where the well-
head value is calculated as the sales value of production net of ‘off-lease’ costs relating 
to production and transport to point of sale 
PRT = Petroleum Revenue Tax (UKCS). Calculated on pre-tax profits (revenues – 
operating costs – capital allowances) 
SPT = Special Petroleum Tax (NCS). Calculated on total taxable profits 
SCT = Supplementary Corporate Tax. Calculated on total taxable profits 
FTP = First Tranche Petroleum. A percent of production is divided between the 
contractor and the government according to their pre-tax profit share entitlements.  
CT = Corporation Tax (UKCS). Calculated on pre-tax profits (revenues – operating costs 
– capital allowances) less PRT 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
UKCS
UKCS 
PRT NCS
GoM 
SHALLOW 
WATER
GoM DEEP 
WATER
ANGOLA 
IRR
ANGOLA 
PROD EGYPT INDONESIA
R 16.7% 12.5%
FTP 10-20%
PRT 50%
SCT 50%
SCT 10% 10%
CT 40% 40% 28%
FIT 35% 35%
CIT 50% 50%
C&W 44-56%
B S/P S/P S/P S/P/C
PO 25-90%1 40-90%2 70-85%3 65-85%4
PG 25-90%1 40-90%2 70-85%3 55-70%4
PC price cap5 DOM6 DOM7
CONCESSION PSC
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FIT = Federal Corporate income Tax (GoM). Calculated on operating profit net of 
allowable deductions 
CIT = Corporate (petroleum) Income Tax (Angola). Calculated on the contractor’s share 
of profit oil (gas), less price cap 
C&W = Corporation and Withholding tax (Indonesia, effective rate). An effective tax 
rate integrating both standard income tax and dividend withholding tax, and is levied 
on the contractor’s FTP, and the contractor’s share of profit oil less allowable costs. 
B = Bonus (S = Signature bonus, P = production bonus and C = Compensation bonus). 
Signature bonuses are payable for each contract, and the amount varies widely, but 
typically reflects the perceived prospectivity of the area. A production bonus is payable 
for each contract and the amount is typically a biddable item.  
PO = Profit Oil. Under PSA tax terms a percent of production is available for the 
recovery of operation and capital costs. The remaining production after cost recovery is 
termed profit oil/gas and is divided between the contractor and the government. The 
basis on which this division is made varies between contracts. Some contracts are 
based on the contractor’s rate of return (based on the contractor’s accumulated 
compounded post-tax cash flow), whereas in other contracts the split is based on 
cumulative production. Within each contractor the split varies according to a sliding 
scale or is based on a constant basis. Profit oil/gas shares are negotiable and therefore 
oilfield specific. 
PG = Profit gas.  
PC = Price cap. A capping mechanism where the government receives an excess fee, 
calculated as the difference between the market price and the price cap, multiplied by 
the number of barrels in the contractor’s share of profit oil. 
DMO = Domestic Supply Obligation. A percent of the contractor’s share of oil 
production must be supplied to the local market at a price considerably lower than 
prevailing market prices. 
1 Sliding scale IRR (terms are negotiable and field specific),  
2 Sliding scale production terms (terms are negotiable and field specific)  
3 Sliding scale production terms (terms are negotiable and field specific) 
4 Location and contract specific profit splits 
5 The price cap is calculated as the difference between the market price of oil and the 
negotiated cap. 
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TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Angolan Field Oil and gas reserves, oil and gas production and net 
present value of reserves at January 2006 – Under Angolan domestic 
tax terms and Gulf of Mexico concession tax terms a  
 
 
a Abbreviations: 
NPV = Net present value (in US$ millions). 
mmboe = barrel-of-oil equivalent units (in millions). Calculated by summing the 
physical units of oil (measured in barrels) and gas (measured in thousands of cubic 
feet), where gas reserves volumes are converted into oil equivalents by dividing by six. 
PSC = production sharing contract. 
GoM = Gulf of Mexico. 
 
 
 
P22.5 P33.75 P45 P67.5 P90 P22.5 P33.75 P45 P67.5 P90
Reserves 659 550 408 293 240 700 700 700 700 700
(mmboe)
Production 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
('000boe/d)
Remaining NPV 1989 3053 3182 3842 4334 2659 4769 6545 11053 15227
(US$ millions)
Angolan field under 
domestic PSC tax terms
Angolan field under
 GoM concession tax terms
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Sample Statistics a 
 
No. of 
fields 
in 
sample
No. of 
fields in 
population
Sample 
fields as 
% of 
populatio
n fields
Total 
remaining oil 
and gas 
reserves in 
sample fields 
(mmboe)
Total 
remaining oil 
and gas 
reserves in 
population 
(mmboe)
Sample 
reserves 
as % of 
population 
reserves
CONCESSION
GOM 50 130 38.5% 6063 7467 81.2%
NCS 50 105 47.6% 25851 27311 94.7%
UKCS 67 380 17.6% 5431 10127 53.6%
Total concession 167 615 27.2% 37345 44905 83.2%
PSA
ANGOLA 28 48 58.3% 8636 10755 80.3%
EGYPT 42 53 79.2% 6123 6712 91.2%
INDONESIA 55 71 77.5% 10722 12426 86.3%
Total PSA 125 172 72.7% 25481 29893 85.2%
Total sample 292 787 37.1% 62826 74798 84.0%
 
a Abbreviations: 
GoM = Gulf of Mexico 
NCS = Norwegian Continental Shelf 
UKCS = UK Continental Shelf 
Mmboe = barrel-of-oil equivalent (in millions) 
PSC = Production sharing contracts 
 
NOTE: PSC totals in Table 2 shows the country reserves pre-production sharing by the 
government and hence - do not tie in with values in Table 6 where the latter reflect  
government participation. 
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TABLE 3 
Responses of Reserve entitlement to oil and gas price change.  
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
Concession
GoM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NCS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
UKCS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PSC
Angola -0.451 -0.684 -0.405 -0.388
Egypt -0.253 -0.271 -0.154 -0.132
Indonesia -0.324 -0.297 -0.154 -0.130
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
GoM vs Angola *** *** *** ***
GoM vs Egypt *** *** *** ***
GoM vs Indonesia *** *** *** ***
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
Concession
GoM vs NCS - - - -
GoM vs UKCS - - - -
NCS vs UKCS - - - -
PSC
Angola vs Egypt * *** *** ***
Angola vs Indonesia ns *** *** ***
Egypt vs Indonesia ns ns ns ns
Panel A: Reserve response
Panel B: Statistical analysis (concession vs PSC)
Panel C: Statistical analysis (intra-regime comparison)
 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels respectively, in a two-tailed t-
test. n.s. denotes non-significance. Panel A denotes reserves disclosure response in reaction to 
price movements. In Panel B, T-tests are carried out between GoM (benchmark) and UKCS, 
NCS, Angola, Egypt and Indonesia to test if responses of production SEC disclosures are 
significantly different from those of GoM oilfields. In Panel C – Tests for difference are also 
carried out between individual countries. 
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TABLE 4 
Responses of production entitlement to oil and gas price change 
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
Concession
GoM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NCS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
UKCS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PSC
Angola -0.291 -0.348 -0.162 -0.181
Egypt -0.205 -0.169 -0.087 -0.106
Indonesia -0.466 -0.142 -0.173 0.064
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
GoM vs Angola *** ** *** ***
GoM vs Egypt *** *** ** ***
GoM vs Indonesia * n.s. *** n.s.
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
Concession
GoM vs NCS - - - -
GoM vs UKCS - - - -
NCS vs UKCS - - - -
PSC
Angola vs Egypt ns ns ns ns
Angola vs Indonesia ns ns ns ns
Egypt vs Indonesia ns ns ns ns
Panel A: Production response
Panel B: Statistical analysis (concession vs PSC)
Panel C: Statistical analysis (intra-regime comparison)
 
 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels respectively, in a two-tailed t-
test. n.s. denotes non-significance. Panel A denotes production disclosure response in reaction 
to price movements. In Panel B, T-tests are carried out between GoM (benchmark) and UKCS, 
NCS, Angola, Egypt and Indonesia to test if responses of production SEC disclosures are 
significantly different from those of GoM oilfields. In Panel C – Tests for difference are also 
carried out between individual countries. 
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TABLE 5 
Responses of remaining oilfield PV to oil and gas price change 
 
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
Concession
GoM 1.306 1.197 1.196 1.121
NCS 2.159 1.288 1.243 1.071
UKCS 1.603 1.401 1.352 1.240
PSC
Angola 1.587 0.713 0.330 0.332
Egypt 1.190 0.974 0.964 0.972
Indonesia 1.976 1.318 1.266 1.125
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
GoM vs Angola n.s. *** *** ***
GoM vs Egypt n.s. *** *** ***
GoM vs Indonesia ** * n.s. n.s.
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
Concession
GoM vs NCS * n.s. n.s. n.s.
GoM vs UKCS n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
NCS vs UKCS n.s. n.s. n.s. *
PSC
Angola vs Egypt *** *** *** ***
Angola vs Indonesia ns * *** ***
Egypt vs Indonesia ns *** *** ***
Panel A: NPV response
Panel B: Statistical analysis (concession vs PSC)
Panel C: Statistical analysis (intra-regime comparison)
 
 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels respectively, in a two-tailed t-
test. n.s. denotes non-significance. Panel A denotes PV disclosure response in reaction to price 
movements. In Panel B, T-tests are carried out between GoM (benchmark) and UKCS, NCS, 
Angola, Egypt and Indonesia to test if responses of production SEC disclosures are significantly 
different from those of GoM oilfields. In Panel C – Tests for difference are also carried out 
between individual countries. 
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TABLE 6 
Reserves entitlement (mmboe) and changes in reserves (relative to base 
case, US$45) 
 
P22.5 P33.75 P45 P67.5 P90
-50 % -25 % 0 % 50 % 100 %
Concession
Reserves entitlement 6123 6123 6123 6123 6123
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Reserves entitlement 25851 25851 25851 25851 25851
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Reserves entitlement 5431 5431 5431 5431 5431
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
PSC
Reserves entitlement 6845 5877 4969 3698 3110
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
38 % 18 % 0 % -26 % -37 %
Reserves entitlement 3899 3664 3498 3327 3242
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
11 % 5 % 0 % -5 % -7 %
Reserves entitlement 12664 10786 10723 10027 9679
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
18 % 1 % 0 % -6 % -10 %
Price Change 
relative to P45
Angola
Egypt
Indonesia
GoM
NCS
UKCS
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Table 7 
NPV (US$M) and changes in NPV (relative to base case, US$45) 
P22.5 P33.75 P45 P67.5 P90
-50 % -25 % 0 % 50 % 100 %
Concession
Remaining NPV (US$M) 25475 45328 66174 106792 147400
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
38 % 68 % 100 % 161 % 223 %
Remaining NPV (US$M) 29015 56614 82110 132387 182483
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
35 % 69 % 100 % 161 % 222 %
Remaining NPV (US$M) 20518 28594 41184 67050 92848
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
50 % 69 % 100 % 163 % 225 %
PSC
Remaining NPV (US$M) 19166 33092 41016 50576 58530
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
47 % 81 % 100 % 123 % 143 %
Remaining NPV (US$M) 6720 14101 18851 27958 36966
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
36 % 75 % 100 % 148 % 196 %
Remaining NPV (US$M) 9334 20178 30238 49800 69296
Response to oil price change 
relative to P45
31 % 67 % 100 % 165 % 229 %
Egypt
Indonesia
GoM
NCS
UKCS
Angola
Price Change 
relative to P45
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FIGURES 
FIGURE 1: 
Expected development of production entitlement over time for a 
hypothetical Angolan oil field under conditions of oil price volatility 
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FIGURE 2 
The Oil Price Relationship between  Reserves and NPV - Changes in 
aggregate reserves (a) and aggregate remaining NPV (b) when oil 
price changes from a base case of US$45/bbl 
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